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I. Introduction 
 For decades, authors like George Orwell, Ayn Rand and Ray Bradbury have 
depicted catastrophic visions of dystopia arising out of our society’s advancement: a 
world where the government sees all and men must fear their own thoughts.1 Conversely, 
the ability to prove veracity has been a power sought by society throughout history, 
evident in all cultures from the oracles of ancient mythology to the “veritaserum” in the 
Harry Potter series.2  The clash of these two interests may seem to be exaggerated in 
novels like 1984, Fahrenheit 451 and Anthem,3 but this balance may soon be evaluated in 
Oklahoma courts in a very real way. On June 12, 2008, a woman in India was convicted 
of murder based on evidence that included a “brain fingerprinting” scan, which 
essentially analyzed the content of her memory and found her brain to contain stored 
knowledge regarding the circumstances of the murder.4  This is the first instance of 
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 RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (Simon & Schuster 2003) (1966); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Penguin 
Books 2003) (1949); AYN RAND, ANTHEM (Coyote Canyon Press 2008) (1938).  
2
 In the young adult literature series Harry Potter, “veritaserum” is a powerful magical potion which 
compels truthful answers from the drinker. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE 
PHOENIX 744 (2003).  
3
 See supra note 1. 
4
 Anand  Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts Is Debated, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, 
at A10. 
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neuro-lie-detection technology to have been admitted for the prosecution in court 
anywhere, and the reactions range from enthusiasm to horror.5 
 The battle over admitting neuroimagery evidence has been heated since the 
widely publicized trial of John Hinckley, Jr., for his assassination attempt on President 
Reagan.6  In that case, computer tomography scans were admitted to prove that Hinckley 
was incapable of the mental state required for the crime, and the resulting acquittal by 
reason of insanity caused outrage.7  Some proponents of neuro-imaging evidence point to 
the use of neuro scanning technology in Roper v. Simmons as an endorsement of neuro-
evidence by the United States Supreme Court.8  However, the most recent advancements 
claim not simply to scan the brain for functional or developmental deficiency as in these 
past cases, but to truly translate a person’s thought process from the images.9  Although 
India’s novel ruling has raised serious ethical questions of whether such evidence is 
reliable enough for use in court,10 the potential for new neuroimaging methods is 
undeniably astonishing.  Functional magnetic resonance imaging, or fMRI, as a lie-
detector is especially promising, 11 despite the fact that other forms of lie detection 
technology have been held inadmissible for over eighty years.12  Although there is some 
debate over the exact accuracy of fMRI, to date, this technology has even demonstrated 
the ability to recognize a specific item - such as a screwdriver or a window - that a person 
                                                 
5
 Id. 
6
 O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 
1293 (2007). 
7
 United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
8
 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
9
 The newest scanning technologies, like fMRI, about which this article focuses, can recognize different 
types of cognitive patterns which directly correspond to thoughts  − this is discussed throughout. 
10
 Giridharadas, supra note 4, at A10.  
11
 Mark Pettit, Jr., FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J. L. 
& MED. 319, 320 (2007).  
12
 Eric K. Gerard, Waiting in the Wings? The Admissibility of Neuroimagery for Lie Detection, 27 DEV. 
MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 24 (2008).  
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is thinking of merely by reading the computerized images of that person’s brain 
activity.13  Proponents claim the ability of fMRI technology to discern truth from 
deception will soon be absolute.14 
Case law on these advanced deception detection technologies is sparse at best, but 
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has had one of the few unique opportunities to  
confront the early use of neuro-lie-detection evidence.15  Because the Oklahoma 
Evidence Code parallels the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding expert testimony, an 
understanding of federal interpretation concerning novel science will be significant for 
fMRI evidence in Oklahoma.  In fact, early cases of neuro scanning evidence in 
Oklahoma may have great influence on the outcome of the battle over fMRI admissibility 
in many jurisdictions.  This comment will discuss fMRI and its chances at admissibility 
in Oklahoma courts and in the Tenth Circuit, which both follow the Daubert decision 
when evaluating novel scientific evidence, and propose an explanation of why it should 
be admitted as reliable.  Part II of this comment will give a succinct explanation of how 
fMRI functions for lie detection purposes.  Part III will present an overview of the 
standard for novel science admissibility and review how the Daubert standard has been 
applied in Oklahoma courts.  Part IV will discuss the likelihood that fMRI technology 
will succeed under a proper Daubert analysis by considering the four factors of 
reliability.  Part V will cover several other considerations that may hinder the 
admissibility of fMRI evidence in Oklahoma courts, even if it passes the Daubert 
                                                 
13
 How Technology May Soon “Read” Your Mind, 60 Minutes: Incredible Research Lets Scientists Get a 
Glimpse at Your Thoughts, CBS NEWS, Jan. 4, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/31/60minutes/main4694713.shtml [hereinafter CBS NEWS]. 
14
 Telephone Interview with Joel Huizenga, founder and CEO, No Lie MRI, Inc. (Jan. 19, 2009). 
15
 Slaughter v. State, 2005 OK CR 2, ¶ 7, 105 P.3d 832, 834.  
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standard, including Oklahoma Evidence Code section 2403, province of the jury 
concerns, and our society’s cultural aversion to “mind reading” technology.  This 
comment will conclude with Part VI. 
II. Understanding fMRI Deception Detection 
 The term “lie detector” is most commonly associated with a fairly dated 
technology known as the polygraph test, so an understanding of the differences between 
this procedure and fMRI is important.16  The original polygraph test was performed by 
measuring systolic blood pressure; spikes in blood pressure were assumed to be a 
physical manifestation of the anxiety caused by lying.17  Improvements in polygraph 
procedure include monitoring respiration, skin resistance and cardiovascular function.18  
This data is recorded by machine, and the end result of such a test is actually an 
interpretation of the test subject’s physical reaction data by a human technician, or 
polygrapher.19  The human variable of the test - that is the personality of the polygrapher 
or the methods of asking questions - can affect the results of a polygraph.20  The 
polygrapher may have increased influence when beginning the test by intentionally 
instilling fear in the test subject, which is a common practice.21  These methods are not 
always accurate, both because the polygraph test only reflects physical reactions to stress 
that may or may not be the result of answering falsely, and because of the possibility of 
                                                 
16
 See Leo Kittay, Note, The Cultural Bias Against “Mind Reading” Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351, 
1356 (2007).  
17
 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
18
 John C. Bush, Warping the Rules: How Some Courts Misapply Generic Evidentiary Rules to Exclude 
Polygraph Evidence, 59 VAND. L. REV. 539, 540 (2006).  
19
 Id.  
20
 Id. 
21
 Lloyd C. Peeples, III, et al., Exculpatory Polygraphs in the Courtroom: How the Truth May Not Set You 
Free, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 77, 79 (1998).  
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numerous uncontrolled variables.22  The results can be skewed by either the involuntary 
anxiety of a nervous person who is answering truthfully or by induced anxiety, such as a 
person flexing their muscles during truthful answers to even out the results.23  
Furthermore, certain people are simply very skilled at controlling their physiological 
responses to lying.24  
In 1998, the Supreme Court faced its most recent case challenging the admission 
of polygraph evidence, this time in court-martial proceedings, and held that “there is 
simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable.”25  Because the reliability of this 
test has always been questioned26 it has been ruled inadmissible by not only the United 
States Supreme Court in Frye v. United States, in 1923,27 but time and time again by 
numerous United States Circuit Courts, including the Tenth Circuit in United States v. 
Call, in 1997.28   Polygraph evidence has continued to be excluded even after the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence’s more flexible standard for assessing such 
methods.29  Although United States v. Posado was a remarkable case where the Fifth 
Circuit held that a per se ban on polygraph evidence was untenable,30 concerns about the 
reliability of the process have consistently kept polygraph results out of court.31  
                                                 
22
 Bush, supra note 18, at 542.  
23
 Kittay, supra note 16, at 1364.  
24
 Laurence R. Trancredi, Neuroscience Developments and  the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: 
BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 71, 103 (Brent Garland ed., 2004).  
25
 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998).  
26
 Michael J. Ligons, Polygraph Evidence: Where Are We Now?, 65 MO. L. REV. 209, 214 (2000). 
27
 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
28
 United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997).  
29
 There is a continuing line of cases that excludes polygraph evidence after the adoption of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, in 1977, and these cases are discussed immediately supra. 
30
 United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 1995).  
31
 Polygraph evidence has been consistently held to be unreliable and therefore inadmissible in court. 
Scheffer, 523 U.S.  at 309 (“there is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable”); Call, 129 
F.3d at 1405 (“polygraph evidence is neither reliable nor admissible”); United States v. Scarborough, 43 
F.3d 1021, 1026 (6th Cir. 1994) (polygraph tests are “inherently unreliable”); State v. Ulland, 943 P.2d 
947, 954 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (“the results of a polygraph examination are too unreliable to be admissible 
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In contrast, fMRI deception detection is an entirely different scientific process.  It 
does not share most of the concerns associated with the polygraph because fMRI 
considers not the outward physical manifestations of a lie, but rather examines the source 
of the false answer - the mental process of lying.32  Current deception detection using 
fMRI began as a test developed in 2001 by Daniel Langleben, M.D, at the University of 
Pennsylvania, to analyze the areas of a person’s brain activated during a lie.33  The 
science behind fMRI is intense, but the concept is fairly easy to understand: when you are 
telling the truth, only the memory regions of your brain become active and are detected in 
the fMRI, but when you are lying your brain lights up like fireworks.34  fMRI measures 
the oxygen levels in different neural regions, known as the blood oxygen level dependent, 
or BOLD effect.35  These oxygen levels directly correlate to the amount of metabolism 
(or cellular activity) in that area, so that higher the oxygen levels express more activity 
present in a certain neural region.36  “[E]ngaging in deception requires additional 
cognitive processing that will involve centers in the brain controlling executive functions 
such as problem solving, planning, and the conscious manipulation of information in 
working memory.”37   
                                                                                                                                                 
at trial”); Morgan v. Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Ky. 1991) (“the results of polygraph 
examinations are unreliable and are therefore inadmissible”); Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 871, 872 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1975) (polygraphs are inadmissible “in light of the potential unreliability of polygraph 
examinations”).  
32
 Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioural and Functional Anatomical Correlates of Deception in Humans, 12 
NEUROREPORT 2849, 2849-50 (2001).  
33
 Daniel D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-Related Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 727-28 (2002) [hereinafter Langleben et al., Brain 
Activity]. 
34
 John G. New, If You Could Read My Mind: Implications of Neurological Evidence for Twenty-First 
Century Criminal Jurisprudence, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 179, 180 (2008).  
35
 Archie Alexander, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Lie Detection: Is a “Brainstorm” Heading 
Toward the “Gatekeeper”?, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 15-20 (2006).  
36
 Id.  
37
 New, supra note 34, at 181.  
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Studies even report that this technology can distinguish between different types of 
deception: isolated lies, spontaneous lies and “well-rehearsed lies that fit into a coherent 
story.”38  This suggests that no matter how well prepared a person is or how often a story 
has been repeated the fMRI will detect intentional falsity.  Also, to accentuate the 
difference between memory and creative thinking, examiners could pose the questions in 
an unanticipated way that would ensure at least some additional processing even if the 
subject had prepared a logical false story beforehand.  However, fMRI is not a crystal 
ball that can reveal all answers. It can only recognize a lie; it cannot retrieve alternative 
information from a person’s mind.39  Also, because it detects deception, it retains one 
limitation of the polygraph: the inability to discern the truth from subjectively honest but 
inaccurate or erroneously recalled statements.40 
Although experts are still investigating exactly which neural areas are linked to 
specific cognitive processes involved with lying, the consensus is that far more regions 
activate during any type of deception than during a statement of truth, and that these are 
different from the regions associated with truth.41  The current evidence from these 
                                                 
38
 G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL 
CORTEX 830, 830 (2003).  
39
 Gerard, supra note 12. 
40
 Id.  
41
 The following are a list of current fMRI studies regarding deception detection: Nobuhito Abe et al., 
Deceiving Others: Distinct Neural Responses of the Prefrontal Cortex and Amygdala in Simple Fabrication 
and Deception with Social Interactions, 19 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 287 (2007); C. Davatzikos et al., 
Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with Machine Learning Methods: Application to Lie 
Detection, 28 NEUROIMAGE 663 (2005); Ganis, supra note 38; Nathan J. Gordon et al., Integrated Zone 
Comparison Polygraph Technique Accuracy with Scoring Algorithms, 87 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 251 
(2006); F.A. Kozel et al., Functional MRI Detection of Deception After Committing a Mock Sabotage 
Crime, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Kozel et al., Functional MRI Detection]; F.A. Kozel et al., 
Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 58 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 605 (2005) 
[hereinafter Kozel et al., Detecting Deception]; F.A. Kozel et al., A Pilot Study of Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in Healthy Young Men, 16 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLIN. 
NEUROSCI. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Kozel et al., A Pilot Study]; F.A. Kozel et al., A Replication Study of the 
Neural Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 852 (2004); Daniel D. Langleben et al., 
Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262 
(2005); Langleben et al., Brain Activity, supra note 33; Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Functional MR Imaging 
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studies supports increased activation associated with different lying processes in the 
bilateral, ventrolateral, dorsolateral, inferolateral, dorsal medial, ventromedial and right 
anterior prefrontal corices, the amygdala, the anterior cingulate, areas of the parietal and 
temporal lobe, and certain sub-cortical regions.42  This information is processed through 
increasingly advanced computer software, which produces vivid and tangible snapshots 
of neural activity during different questions that can be examined and compared, 
potentially by a jury.43 
  Any promising new technology raises questions of whether it is reliable enough 
for use outside the research context, such as admissibility in court, but experts are putting 
forth great effort to increase the accuracy of fMRI deception detection and achieve 
admissibility.44  According to Joel Huizenga, founder and CEO of No Lie MRI, Inc., the 
reliability is already confirmed as quite high.  Currently, the accuracy is around 93%, but 
Huizenga expects to surpass 95% accuracy soon.45  Steven Laken, Ph. D., president and 
CEO of Cephos Corporation, is endorsing an even higher rate, up to 97% accuracy.46  
Criminal defendant’s are now anxious for this technology to be ruled admissible.47  This 
is because these two key companies, No Lie MRI, Inc., and Cephos Corporation, have 
already begun marketing fMRI deception detection as a litigation tool that will provide 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Polygraph Investigation – Initial Experience, 238 RADIOLOGY 679 (2006); Jennifer M. Nuñez et al., 
Intentional False Responding Shares Neural Substrates with Response Conflict and Cognitive Control, 25 
NEUROIMAGE 267 (2005); K. Luan Phan et al., Neural Correlates of Telling Lies: A Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging Study at 4 Tesla, 12 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 164 (2005); Tatia M. C. Lee et al., Lie 
Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 15 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 157 (2002); Spence et 
al., supra note 32. 
42
 See supra text accompanying note 41. 
43
 Kittay, supra note 16, at 1368. 
44
 Laurence R. Trancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal Use of 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 283 (2007). 
45
 Telephone Interview with Joel Huizenga, supra note 14. 
46
 Telephone Interview with Steven Laken, Ph.D., president and CEO, Cephos Corp. (Jan. 21, 2009).  
47
 Id.  
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concrete evidence to support the veracity of a witness’s testimony.48  Such evidence 
could potentially exonerate innocent defendants in a way that has not been matched since 
the inception of DNA evidence.  In addition to its desirable accuracy rates and potential 
impact as evidence, fMRI testing is highly favored because it is relatively harmless; 
“[t]he entire brain can be imaged non-invasively with high resolution and patients are not 
exposed to radiation.”49  This makes fMRI testing an ideal candidate for elective use, 
perfect for litigants and criminal defendants. 
Still, the real test will come when this new form of lie detection science faces the 
hurdles of admissibility in court.  For Oklahoma, this implicates the same standard 
applied to the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding expert testimony and novel science, 
the Daubert standard,50 as well as other evidentiary rules and even stigmatic hurdles.  The 
progressive standard of the Federal Rules is the reason that innovative evidence, such as 
unique forms of DNA testing, have been allowed in Oklahoma courts.  fMRI, an accurate 
and well-tested technology with solid supportive findings, may actually clear the hurdles 
to admissibility under Daubert.51  
III.  Admissibility Under Daubert 
 Although Oklahoma has followed the federal courts in progressing to a modern, 
flexible standard for considering novel scientific evidence, the success of fMRI 
technology under this standard will largely depend on Oklahoma’s particular 
interpretation of the Daubert analysis and the general attitude of Oklahoma courts toward 
                                                 
48
 No Lie MRI, Inc. provides fMRI information and testing to the public.  No Lie MRI – Home Page, 
http://www.noliemri.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). Cephos Corporation is a competitor company also 
marketing fMRI testing to the public.  Cephos Corp Home Page,  http://www.cephoscorp.com (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2010). 
49
 Beth W. Orenstein, Guilty? Investigating fMRI’s Future as a Lie Detector, RADIOLOGY TODAY, May 16, 
2005, at 30, available at http://www.radiologytoday.net/archive/rt_051605p30.shtml.  
50
 Taylor v. State, 1995 OK CR 10, 889 P.2d 319. 
51
 Wood v. State, 1998 OK CR 19, 959 P.2d 1. 
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admitting novel science.  This section will explain how the test for reliability in scientific 
evidence has changed to allow new advancements.  It will also consider how Oklahoma 
has applied this standard to recent scientific developments, and discuss the admission or 
exclusion of neuroimaging technologies in other jurisdictions.  
A. History of the Daubert Standard 
 Introducing scientific evidence in court is powerful and often confusing, thus 
judges guard the admissibility of such evidence to avoid presenting a jury with 
information which will not ultimately help it to reach a decision.52  Historically, this gate 
keeping duty was much easier for judges to fulfill because they needed only to look to the 
currently established beliefs of the scientific community without considering recent 
advancements.53  In Frye v. United States, the court’s concise opinion stated the then-
well-known dictum that expert testimony “must be sufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”54  This decision rejected an 
early version of polygraph technology, the systolic blood pressure deception test, because 
it “had not yet gained such standing and scientific re-cognition among physiological and 
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony 
deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.”55  This 
clearly left no room for the admission of novel science, and for seventy years courts 
considered only “well-recognized scientific principle[s] or discovery,”56 even after the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.57 
                                                 
52
 FED. R. EVID. 104(a).  
53
 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
54
 Id. at 47. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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 When the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, rule 702 read as following: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, 
if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the 
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of 
the case.58 
This new language requires scientific evidence to be reliable, but nowhere lists any 
requirement that the evidence be generally accepted by the scientific community.  On its 
face, the new rule appears to be a more flexible standard that will allow judges to decide 
whether novel evidence is reliable enough to admit in court without reference to whether 
it is “sufficiently established” in the scientific community.  In 1993, the United States 
Supreme Court confirmed that this new standard allows judges to weigh credibility 
independently of general acceptance.59 
 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the plaintiffs presented evidence of 
in vitro and in vivo animals studies suggesting that the drug Bendectin could cause birth 
defects.60  Although the plaintiff’s experts were well-credentialed, the District Court 
granted summary judgment for the defendant on the grounds that this novel scientific 
evidence presented by the experts did not meet the Frye standard of general acceptance.61  
                                                 
58
 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
59
 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579. 
60
 Id.  
61
 Id. at 583. 
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The Supreme Court considered the inconsistency between Frye and the Federal Rules and 
held that “the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.”62  The Court then set out a framework for judges to follow in fulfilling the 
new “gate-keeping responsibility” proscribed by the Federal Rules.  
 The Court specifically stated that they were not creating a “definitive checklist or 
test,”63 and the decision has been properly interpreted as creating discretionary and non-
exhaustive guidelines.64  Daubert provides a two-step analysis: first, whether the 
evidence is reliable when considering four factors that addressed the credibility of the 
science, and second, whether the evidence is relevant to the facts.65  The first factor to 
consider under the reliability prong of the test is whether the evidence has been tested, 
focusing specifically on its falsifiability, meaning whether the science could be proven 
false.66  Under the second factor, the Court discussed publication and peer review, which 
would increase chance that an erroneous method has been scrutinized or refuted.67  
However, the Court stated that a lack of publication was not dispositive because some 
reliable advancements are worthwhile but too new to yet be published at the time they are 
offered in court.68  This is because publication can often take several years.69  Under the 
third factor, the Court discussed the error rate of the new technique or method, focusing 
on the amount of control used in reaching a conclusion.70  A specific minimum error rate 
is not stated however, as the jury merely needs to have a basis for assessing how much 
                                                 
62
 Id. at 587. 
63
 Id. at 592. 
64
 Andrew B. Gagen, What Is an Environmental Expert? The Impact of Daubert, Joiner and Kumho Tire on 
the Admissibility of Scientific Expert Evidence, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 401, 408 (2002). 
65
 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. 
66
 Id. at 593. 
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. 
69
 Telephone Interview with Steven Laken, supra note 46. 
70
 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
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weight to give the evidence ultimately.71  Under the fourth factor, the Court returned to 
the science’s acceptance in the scientific community, stating that although this is not 
required it is still relevant in deciding whether a novel science is credible.72  All of these 
factors are weighed together when the judge evaluates the reliability of the science.73  It is 
important to remember that “[t]he focus, of course, must be solely on principles and 
methodology, not the conclusions that they generate.”74  A proper Daubert analysis will 
focus on the process without being influenced by feasibility of the results produced.75  
 Oklahoma first adopted this progressive and flexible standard in Taylor v. State, 
which considered the admission of DNA evidence as a matter of first impression in 
Oklahoma.76  Oklahoma Evidence Code section 2702 was adopted to govern expert 
testimony; it was identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, except that at the time of its 
adoption it did not list specific factors for considering reliability:  “If scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”77  It has 
since been amended to mirror the Federal Rules.  When the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals confronted the issue of novel science, it held that “the time is right for this court 
to abandon the Frye test and adopt the more structured and yet flexile admissibility 
standard set forth in Daubert.”78  The court stated that this new standard provided more 
                                                 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id.  
73
 Gagen, supra note 64, at 409. 
74
 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.  
75
 Gagen, supra note 64, at 412.  
76
 Taylor v. State, 1995 OK CR 10, 889 P.2d 319. 
77
 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2702 (1981). 
78
 Taylor, ¶ 15, 889 P.2d at 328. 
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“structure and guidance” for what had previously been a confusing analysis, and that it 
would more properly consider the language of the Oklahoma Evidence Code.79   
The Taylor court also made a point to address the standard of review for 
specifically novel scientific evidence under Daubert.  In the past, Oklahoma had asserted 
an abuse of discretion standard, but had nevertheless “conducted extensive, independent 
review of novel scientific evidentiary material in determining whether the trial judges’ 
decision admitting or excluding it was proper.”80  The court held that the standard of 
review for such evidence should be de novo, rather than a review “limited by deference to 
the trial judge’s discretion.”81  In this aspect, Oklahoma courts differ from federal courts.  
This difference may have great impact on fMRI evidence, as it presents far more 
opportunity for the appellate court in Oklahoma to reconsider the reliability of new 
scientific evidence than a circuit court or another jurisdiction which follows the federal 
standard of review.  
Essentially, Oklahoma Evidence Code section 2702, and those like it, allow the 
use of “scientific evidence” in court. The Daubert decision then provides the criteria for 
assessing whether evidence is truly “scientific”.82  Each of the Daubert factors is 
fundamentally a means to evaluate accuracy and reproducibility, which in science is the 
systematic basis for scientific credibility.83  Clearly, an inquiry into accuracy rates and 
controls is an assessment of accuracy; an appraisal of the testing, publication, peer-review 
process and acceptance within the relevant scientific field is an effort to make certain that 
                                                 
79
 Id. ¶ 16, 889 P.2d at 329. 
80
 Id. ¶ 22, 889 P.2d at 331.  
81
 Id. ¶ 22, 889 P.2d at 331-32. 
82
 “[I]n a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.” 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 
83
 Telephone Interview with Joel Huizenga, supra note 14.  
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others have achieved the same results, and that if they did not, this discrepancy has been 
exposed.  If performed objectively, a Daubert analysis merely reinforces the integrity of 
the scientific method when admitting science as evidence.  
B. Novel Science in Oklahoma 
 Taylor’s admittance of DNA evidence was Oklahoma’s first indication of a 
preference toward admitting novel science under the Daubert standard.84  Taylor 
addressed the first prong of Daubert by considering the four factors of reliability.  First, 
the court noted that DNA theory and techniques could be and were at that time tested in 
numerous studies.85  Second, the court noted that these techniques had been subjected to 
peer review in several instances and that no article had discredited the DNA techniques 
presented.86  Third, the court considered the rate of error of DNA matching and the 
“series of quality control steps” taken during this process.87  The court mentioned that 
although no exact figure was given for a potential rate of error, evidence suggested that it 
was extremely unlikely that a mistake in testing would result in an incorrect finding of 
DNA match, or false positive, but rather would produce no result at all.88  Fourth, the 
court returned to the general acceptance of DNA matching found in the record, which 
further supported the court’s holding that this technique for DNA profiling was 
“sufficiently reliable to have warranted admission.”89  Finally, the court considered the 
second prong of Daubert, finding that DNA profiling was relevant to the facts of the 
case.90  Although the Court did not approach the reliability factors as a checklist, its 
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decision does not necessarily show a more lenient analysis of expert testimony because 
all four factors were easily met, including a finding of general acceptance, which would 
have allowed the evidence in under the Frye standard.91  Nevertheless, the court did 
accept evidence of possible error in the process; there was sufficient testimony at the 
hearing that the procedure employed adequate controls and that DNA profiling was 
highly accurate, but this testimony did not suggest the method was perfect.92  
 In Wood v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals faced a similar issue 
of first impression regarding a new development in DNA matching known as the PCR 
method.  After review, the court also found that this evidence met the Daubert standard.93  
Reviewing the trial court’s Daubert analysis, the court noted that (1) the new methods 
had been tested, (2) the methods had been peer-reviewed, (3) evidence of a sufficient 
error rate had been presented, and (4) several other jurisdictions had admitted evidence of 
the PCR method of DNA testing by finding that it was generally accepted within the 
scientific community.94  
This decision is similar to Taylor in that it admitted another novel scientific 
method under Daubert, and yet did not confront a situation where several factors were 
fulfilled while one was found lacking.95  Similar to Taylor, the novel science considered 
in Wood was a matter of first impression in Oklahoma, thus subjecting it to section 2702, 
but the method had been found by other jurisdictions to be generally accepted.96  Both of 
these cases suggest that Oklahoma is willing to admit novel science, but do not 
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necessarily imply that Oklahoma will be more lenient under Daubert than it was under 
Frye, or that it will admit evidence so new that it is deficient under one of the reliability 
factors. 
 A different type of science was considered by Oklahoma under a Daubert analysis 
in Gilson v. State in 2000.97  In this case, the court reviewed a theory used by Dr. Wanda 
Draper to determine whether children who were subject to abuse were competent to be 
witnesses at trial.98  Here, the trial court did not accept the doctor’s method as reliable 
after a Daubert analysis, and the exclusion of this evidence was under review.99  The 
court held that there was no error in excluding the evidence, and discussed three of the 
Daubert factors.100  First, the court noted that there was no testimony that this method of 
assessing the competence of children could or had been tested.101  The court made no 
mention of publication or peer review, but noted secondly that no evidence had been 
presented that this method was generally accepted in the child development field.102  
Lastly, the court discusses several reasons why there could be significant error with Dr. 
Draper’s assessment, including the fact that the children had only been interviewed once, 
and that incorrect interview techniques could have greatly affected the children.103  These 
unmonitored variables reflected inadequate controls.  The court’s decision did not need to 
include a discussion of all four factors once an analysis of three factors led to the 
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conclusion that the method was unreliable, because the Daubert analysis is appropriately 
applied as a flexible standard of balancing guidelines, and not as a checklist.104 
 This decision provides some insight on what will render a novel method 
unreliable under section 2702 in Oklahoma.  The court did not consider every factor, but 
did find that three of the four conveyed unreliability, holding that the method did not 
survive the Daubert standard.  Still, when the court examined the record for evidence of 
these factors during the hearing it found no evidence to support reliability.105  This does 
not provide a clear understanding of how the court would rule if evidence was present in 
the record but minimal - or contradictory - regarding only one of the reliability factors.  
 Another situation was presented in Christian v. Gray, in which the trial court 
excluded the expert evidence of lung damage due to a lack of pre-injury spirometry 
testing (a measure of lung function).106  This case exemplifies the standard of review 
applied in Oklahoma when reviewing a Daubert decision on the admissibility of 
scientific evidence.107  The trial court attempted a Daubert analysis regarding the expert’s 
finding that damage was due to chemical exposure by the defendant, but stated that a 
main reason for denying admissibility was “because the expert did not possess ‘baseline 
data’ of Plaintiff’s pulmonary functions prior to Plaintiff’s exposure.”108  However, the 
court does not find in the record that this baseline test was considered necessary by others 
in the field in order for the expert’s findings to be credible.109  The trial court’s desire for 
evidence of a “baseline” test for lung function before the alleged injury savors strongly of 
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the focus on “controls” in Daubert, but the record never clearly states this rationale as 
part of a Daubert analysis and the appellate court does not appear to acknowledge this 
possible connection.  As a result, the appellate court holds that the exclusion of the expert 
evidence was erroneous because evidence of a baseline test is not “one of the particular 
Daubert factors, or some other factor determined to be appropriate in applying 
Daubert.”110  Still, the court specifically states that their decision did not determine that 
the expert evidence necessarily satisfied Daubert; rather, the record merely presented this 
as an improper exclusion that failed appellate review and rendered the trial court’s order 
unenforceable.111  
 This case illustrates Oklahoma’s interpretation of the requirements of a trial 
court’s Daubert analysis under section 2702, and the circumstances that could amount to 
erroneous exclusion. Where, as in this case, the exclusion is based on an assumed fact or 
other basis outside the exact Daubert criteria, an Oklahoma appellate court might 
overturn the decision, even when the reason could liberally be construed as part of a 
Daubert factor.  This may suggest a hesitancy to exclude a science when the trial court 
applies strict or inflexible standards for accuracy.  
Gilson and Christian are similar to Wood and Taylor in that these decisions 
confront novel science where the evidence regarding reliability is strongly weighted 
toward one extreme or the other.  These cases fail to provide a definite prediction of how 
Oklahoma courts will rule when there is an even mix of factors that suggest reliability 
and factors that suggest the method or science is unreliable.  Nevertheless, the decisions 
of Taylor and Wood, as well as the requirement that an exclusion be made consistent with 
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Daubert factors, would seem to suggest a warm welcome to competent novel science.  
When Oklahoma overturned the decision of the Daubert hearing on the appeal in 
Christian, it was because the science was inappropriately excluded, not inappropriately 
admitted.112  The court’s reaction to what was possibly a stringent accuracy argument in 
Christian may alleviate some of the concern over an inordinately severe rate of error 
requirement for neuroimaging evidence.  Because fMRI does in fact display evidence of 
reliability under several other factors, and this evidence will only be strengthened by the 
time it is offered as evidence in Oklahoma, the court should perform a straightforward 
Daubert analysis and accept it despite other issues, such as an aversion to futuristic 
technology or a section 2403 analysis, discussed infra. 
C. Neuroimaging Technology in Court 
Although at the time of this writing no case directly addresses fMRI deception 
detection under Daubert,113 two criminal defendants have attempted to admit the lie-
detection-related technology of “brain fingerprinting” in post-conviction proceedings, 
one of which occurred in Oklahoma.114  Although this technology is fundamentally 
different than fMRI in both theory and application, and therefore should not be compared 
to fMRI, this case does at least provide some understanding of how section 2702 may be 
applied to novel neuroscience.  In 2005, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
reviewed brain fingerprinting, though the decision leaves the issue of admitting 
neuroimaging technologies disappointingly speculative.115  In Slaughter v. State, the 
petitioner appealed his conviction based on the “novel science” of brain fingerprinting, 
                                                 
112
 Christian v. Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 49, 65 P.3d 591, 610. 
113
 A 2009 search of Westlaw and LexisNexis revealed no case law for fMRI evidence of this particular 
application.  
114
 Slaughter v. State, 2005 OK CR 2,105 P.3d 832. 
115
 Id. 
    
 21 
which he argued should be admitted for post-conviction relief because it was not 
available at the time of his trial.116  In this case, brain fingerprinting entailed a brain scan 
during which the petitioner was asked about the details of the crime, and where the scan 
results showed that his brain did not contain information which a guilty party’s brain 
would contain.117 
 The court attempted to conduct a thorough Daubert analysis of the reliability of 
brain fingerprinting, but was unfortunately thwarted by an unprepared and unreliable 
expert.118  The court noted that Dr. Farwell, the expert presenting this evidence, provided 
an affidavit that would appear at first to satisfy the four reliability factors: (1) he claimed 
that brain fingerprinting is extensively tested, (2) recognized by peer review and 
published, (3) accurate with a very low error rate, and (4) is generally accepted by those 
in the scientific community dealing specifically with neuroimaging advancement.119  
Nevertheless, the court stated that it could not find brain fingerprinting reliable because 
the claims were “not supported by anything other than [Dr. Farwell’s] bare affidavit.”120  
This affidavit promised the court a comprehensive report, providing details about the 
procedure, yet after six months the court received neither any such report, nor any 
explanation for its absence.121  The court also noted a 2001 report that found the 
technique behind brain fingerprinting had not been well tested or peer reviewed, and that 
it was not generally accepted.122  The court’s consideration of this dated report was not 
practical as doing so disregarded how much critique within the scientific community can 
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develop in a span of five years, particularly with novel technology. Ultimately however, 
the court held that the claims in Dr. Farwell’s affidavit were “unconvincing, and more 
importantly, legally insufficient” for admittance under Daubert.123  
Regrettably, the court should have had the opportunity to consider suitable 
verifications of testing, peer review and error rates, but was unable to do so because of 
poor participation by the expert involved.  The language of this opinion calls Dr. 
Farwell’s claims “interesting,” “startling” and “unconvincing,”124 and makes the mental 
leap that “[t]he failure to provide such evidence to support the claims raised can lead to 
no other conclusion . . . but that such evidence does not exist.”125  Still, this decision did 
not directly denounce the possibility of neuroimaging technologies satisfying Daubert.  It 
merely held that the expert in this particular case provided insufficient material to support 
his claims.  The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided this case in 2005, and 
partially in reference to a critical report from 2001, which in the neuroimaging field 
would have rendered it outdated if not obsolete.  For fMRI evidence offered in the future, 
the few years that have passed since Slaughter will have generated an ever-increasing 
number of published studies and expert reviews, and possibly more general acceptance of 
such technology by scientists and judges alike.  Also, fMRI is a fundamentally different 
technology than brain fingerprinting and is considered to be the imaging technology of 
choice,126 and arguably the best candidates for admittance in court.  By disallowing brain 
fingerprinting to be admitted merely on grounds that the expert failed to supply the 
comprehensive report, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals left open the possibility 
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that a reliable neuroimaging deception detection technology, such as fMRI, could 
successfully present more concrete evidence of credibility and gain admittance.  
The Daubert court made a point to explain that the reliability factors were not 
intended to be used as a checklist; one factor could be insufficient in supporting 
reliability - such as when a new science has not been yet published at the time it is 
offered in court - and yet by balancing all factors the weight of the evidence could still 
support reliability.127  However, most Oklahoma cases reviewing a Daubert analysis do 
not present technologies where some factors suggest the science is highly reliable and 
others suggest the science is unreliable, so it is uncertain how Oklahoma courts will 
address a novel science with mixed evidence of reliability.  Most novel science examined 
in Oklahoma falls clearly to either side of the Daubert line.  Due to the stricter standard 
with which judges may view novel neuroscience, it is possible – though not especially 
likely - that fMRI evidence presented in Oklahoma will be highly scrutinized under one 
or more factors.  This may present a less obvious prediction for rulings in Oklahoma 
courts, but will not preclude fMRI deception detection evidence from surviving an 
objective Daubert test.  
D. Neuroimaging in Other Jurisdictions 
 A few other jurisdictions have had encounters with brain fingerprinting and fMRI 
evidence for applications other than deception detection, yet none have included in their 
opinions any language that would clarify the likelihood of admitting such technology 
under Daubert.  In Harrington v. State, the Supreme Court of Iowa examined evidence of 
brain fingerprinting in an application for post-conviction relief.128  Nevertheless, the court 
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dispensed with the case on a due process issue, thus avoiding any analysis of the 
reliability of the brain fingerprinting evidence.129  
 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Idaho examined a claim of ineffective counsel 
which argued that the attorney should have subjected the defendant to fMRI procedures 
in order to identify a mental abnormality.130  However, this application of fMRI imaging 
was a wholly separate theory from the science of fMRI of deception detection.  Again, 
the court ignored the issue of novel science by stating that the counsel’s strategy and 
methods were not ineffective.131 
 A series of First Amendment cases involving the Entertainment Software 
Association presented fMRI evidence in the Northern District of Illinois and the Eastern 
District of Michigan in 2005, and the District of Minnesota in 2006.132  These cases 
offered fMRI evidence, not for deception detection, but rather to demonstrate the effects 
of violent video games on an adolescent brain.133  Entertainment Software Association et 
al. v. Blagojevich provides a lengthy discussion of fMRI evidence.134  Although the 
procedure measured blood flow to the brain similar to fMRI deception detection, the 
theory of the procedure differed completely; it related to inhibiting impulses, which 
diverges greatly from the study of the BOLD effect in different neural regions.135  The 
court did not do a full Daubert analysis, but did discuss peer review and publication of 
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the method at issue, as well as the possibility of error in the results.136  In discussing the 
error rate, the court found the evidence unpersuasive based on a lack of control for the 
variables in the procedure,137 but after this conclusion the court gave no further analysis 
of the science.  
In Entm’t Software Ass’n et all v. Hatch, the court mentions fMRI studies of 
violence effects on the brain, but finds that the evidence is neither convincing nor 
relevant enough to even warrant a Daubert analysis.138  Likewise, in the third case, 
Entm’t Software Ass’n et all v. Granholm, the court briefly discusses the fMRI studies 
offered, but disregards these studies after only “[a] cursory review of the research,” and 
never applies any Daubert reliability factors.139 
Although some of the above cases consider the reliability of fMRI, none present 
case law which considers fMRI evidence for deception detection.  The procedure for 
assessing the effects of video games is fundamentally different than that for deception 
detection140 and in the few years that have passed since these cases were decided the 
accuracy and techniques of fMRI have greatly increased so that any earlier analysis of 
reliability is no longer relevant.  The decisions do share the common theme of avoiding 
any detailed analysis of reliability, and this possibly reflects a judicial attitude that the 
foremost neuroimaging technologies are not even well-grounded enough to warrant 
analysis in court.  Or perhaps these courts recognize that such technologies were 
presented before they had matured enough to withstand the appropriate tests, and the 
judges simply wished to set them aside for a later court when such evidence is more 
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likely to withstand Daubert and where future judges are more accustomed to assessing 
technological advancements.  In either case, no opinion that has considered fMRI 
evidence, even briefly, has considered the admission of this science for its ability to 
detect deception.  Thus, this dicta can have no real impact on any future analysis of the 
science, even as persuasive support.141  Ultimately, the sparse case law history leaves a 
relatively blank canvas for a decision in Oklahoma regarding the admissibility of fMRI 
deception detection evidence.  
IV. A Daubert Analysis of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
 FMRI deception detection technology may be new and quite incredible, but from 
a strictly black-letter standpoint it is highly likely that fMRI will satisfy the Daubert 
prongs of relevance and reliability.  This section will first discuss the likelihood of 
fMRI’s admissibility under the Daubert reliability factors: testing, peer review and 
publication, rate of error, and general acceptance by the scientific community.  This 
section will also discuss why fMRI will pass the second prong: relevance to the case. 
A. Testing 
 The first factor Daubert discusses for analyzing reliability is “whether the [novel 
science] can be (and has been) tested.”142  The Court goes further and states that a 
primary focus should be on whether the technique or method can be falsified or 
refuted.143  Although fMRI deception detection is quite new, there have been around 
twenty studies by well-recognized companies and academic institutions, and more studies 
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will be conducted each year.144 Langleben’s initial “guilty knowledge” study, completed 
in 2001 and published in 2002, tested subjects with playing cards and revealed that “there 
is a neurophysiological difference between deception and truth at the brain activation 
level that can be detected with fMRI.”145  Another 2001 study, by rival fMRI researcher 
Sean Spence, M.D., discovered “lying (relative to truth) was associated with greater 
activity in bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal cortices” when subjects were asked “yes” or 
“no” questions, and truth produced no increased activity.146  A 2002 study similarly 
discovered that “feigned memory impairment . . . revealed four principle (sic) regions of 
brain activation: prefrontal and frontal, parietal, temporal, and sub-cortical.”147   
A 2003 study further investigated the theory by comparing memorized lies as part 
of a “coherent story” to “spontaneous lies” and found that while spontaneous lies created 
the most activation, both types of lies caused more activation than the truth state.148  In 
2004, F. Andrew Kozel, M.D., published two studies, one which compared individual to 
group results, and another which attempted to replicate past findings and confirmed the 
method of fMRI deception detection as “reasonable.”149 A trio of 2005 studies focused on 
applying fMRI to “single deceptive and truthful responses in individual subjects,” rather 
than group data.150  Two more studies were published in 2005, one of which concluded 
that more activation was present during false responses regarding personal information, 
and another which aimed to “evoke performance anxiety about generating lies” in an 
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attempt to more closely simulate a practical application.151  In 2006 two articles were 
published on a collaborative study which supported past conclusions and also aimed to 
“create a more ‘real life’ experience than traditional analog studies.”152  This study 
involved subjects either shooting a gun or being falsely identified on surveillance footage 
to create emotional stimuli, and a financial incentive to lie successfully which attempted 
to replicate a realistic motivation to be believed.153  In 2007 a study utilized positron 
emission tomography, a method of measuring neural activity through electrical charges, 
to corroborate the fMRI findings which suggested increased activity during deception in 
several pre-frontal sub-regions of the brain, including the left dorsolateral, right anterior 
and ventromedial prefrontal cortices.154  The most recently released study is from 
January, 2009.155  This study again addresses concerns that fMRI testing has been too 
isolated should employ real world scenarios.156  Here, a mock crime group stole and 
damage compact disks containing incriminating footage before undergoing fMRI 
testing.157 
  An article in the American Journal of Law and Medicine discussed the National 
Institute of Health’s ongoing initiative for major research groups that would share and 
compare fMRI test results from twenty-six different institutions,158 which aims to 
minimize variability and ensure uniform results.159  The tests will compare multiple 
procedures with one individual using a single fMRI unit, as well as one individual being 
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tested in different fMRI facilities.160 The comparison of these studies will help confirm 
that fMRI technology is reproducible and has not been falsified or refuted.  Because 
fMRI deception detection is such a recent and quickly-advancing technology, it will 
assuredly attract even further testing and study by well recognized researchers before it 
faces a Daubert analysis in court. Huizenga confirms that No Lie MRI, Inc., has funded a 
number of studies which further investigate and refine deception detection, and that these 
studies are either ongoing or have yet to emerge from the peer review and publication 
process.161   Similarly, Laken will soon be publishing new material that assesses the 
effects that fatigue and decreased motivation for accuracy may have on fMRI 
accuracy.162   
In prior decisions which applied section 2702, Oklahoma appellate courts held 
that minimal discussion of the testing factor would suffice for a proper Daubert analysis, 
only noting that it was apparent to the trial court through testimony that the science in 
question had and could be tested.163  When the court rejected a scientific method under 
section 2702 there was no evidence of testing in the record.164  This does not suggest an 
especially strenuous standard.  Based both on the plentiful testing that fMRI deception 
detection has already undergone, as well as the certainty that such testing will increase in 
both volume and detail before a decision in Oklahoma court, it is extremely likely that 
fMRI will be held reliable under the testing factor, weighing strongly in favor of 
admission under Daubert. 
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B. Peer Review and Publication 
 The second factor the Daubert court considered in deciding reliability is whether 
the novel science has been peer reviewed and published.165  Nevertheless, the Court 
specifically states that peer review and publication “does not necessarily correlate with 
reliability,” acknowledging that some sciences may be too new for publication at the time 
they are admitted in court, but will still present accurate and meaningful evidence.166  The 
Daubert court believed publication was an important consideration because peer-review 
of a novel science allows greater opportunity for a faulty method or theory to be refuted 
or criticized.167  
For fMRI evidence, despite being a very young science, publication and peer 
review should not prove to be a difficult hurdle. Currently, results from numerous fMRI 
studies as well as in depth discussions of the process behind this technology have been 
published in a wide selection of peer-reviewed medical and legal journals.168  These 
articles specifically consider the theory, methods, and accuracy in reference to possible 
application in court.169  More importantly, however, no articles to date have been 
published which refute fMRI deception detection technology or claim an unacceptable 
accuracy rate.170  The amount of critical analysis available on this technology certainly 
appease the Daubert court’s concern that once published and peer reviewed, flaws in the 
methods or theory of a faulty science are more likely to be revealed.171  The fact that this 
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criticism has not occurred with fMRI deception detection strongly supports the 
reproducibility and validity of these results.  
In Oklahoma, courts have allowed novel science to satisfy the factor of peer 
review with a minimal showing.172  In Taylor, the record showed no peer reviewed 
articles that had discredited the science in question, and in Wood the court merely 
accepted at face value testimony that the DNA method had been peer reviewed.173  
Although it is possible that an article may be published which refutes fMRI technology in 
some way before fMRI evidence is offered in court, this is extremely unlikely as there is 
currently no controversy over the legitimacy of the science beyond slightly differing 
accuracy rates or the types of studies performed.174  There is certainly enough publication 
by peer reviewed journals on fMRI technology and methods to satisfy this factor as it has 
been discussed thus far in Oklahoma.  Therefore, a consideration of peer review and 
publication should also weigh heavily in favor of holding that fMRI is a reliable science.  
C. Rate of Error 
 The third factor the Daubert court considered was “the known or potential rate of 
error.”175  The Court further stated that the standards of control for the procedure should 
be considered.176  However, the Daubert court never specifies a statistic that would 
necessarily satisfy the error rate factor.177  Considering the error rate of other types of 
admissible evidence is no more helpful in determining a minimum error rate because 
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many well accepted types of evidence display relatively low accuracy. Nevertheless, it is 
still possible that a novel science which is not well understood (or even feared) by the 
court may be held to a stricter standard with regard to error rate.178  This is perhaps the 
most controversial factor due to inconsistencies between the low error rate expected from 
a science hoping to pass Daubert and the high error rates reported for certain long-
accepted types of evidence.179  For example, eyewitness testimony is frequently 
inaccurate because of faulty memory, stress and a phenomenon called unconscious 
transference.180  These problems explain why eyewitness testimony is arguably the 
number one source of wrongful conviction.181  Still, eyewitness testimony remains a well 
accepted and compelling form of evidence in American courtrooms under the assumption 
that such evidence may help the jury even if it is not one hundred percent accurate.182  
Similarly, fingerprinting methods, another established source of evidence in 
courtrooms, have recently been questioned for not being subjected to the same standard 
of analysis as other sciences, and because certain methods are not supported by known 
error rates.183  In Oklahoma, Stacy v. State discussed and admitted fingerprinting 
evidence in 1930.184  However, this was long before Oklahoma courts incorporated the 
Daubert analysis into their assessment of the reliability of scientific evidence.185  
Although the Stacy decision considered the amount of published work on fingerprinting 
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and the number of other jurisdictions with laws requiring fingerprinting in certain 
situations, the decision makes no mention of error rate.186  Despite the later adoption of 
Daubert, this precedent for admitting scientific evidence with a relatively high or 
unknown error rate has produced unresolved inconsistencies.  
In Oklahoma, the decisions involving a Daubert analysis present only a minimal 
discussion of error rate.  The Taylor court accepted DNA analysis after testimony that the 
company’s work was submitted to a blind test which ensured that proper procedures were 
followed, despite a lack of figures regarding a known or potential rate of error.187  This 
conveys an appropriate focus on control rather than merely what percentage should be 
met for an acceptable error rate.  Still, the Court mentioned that an error would be more 
likely to produce no result than an incorrect result, which addresses the concern of 
wrongful convictions based on extremely persuasive but inaccurate evidence.188  Later, 
the Wood decision again accepted testimony that the rate of error for the new method of 
DNA analysis was acceptable and the laboratory had undergone proficiency testing to 
guarantee proper control and procedure.189  These cases suggest that the showing required 
to satisfy the rate of error factor in Oklahoma would not be especially stringent or 
inflexible. 
In cases where Oklahoma has not found an acceptable error rate, the decision was 
not due to a listed error rate being insufficient, but rather due to a complete absence of 
error rate evidence or a complete lack of baseline control.  In Gilson, the court approved 
exclusion under Daubert because an error rate was not listed, and because the method of 
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using a single interview with multiple human variables presented by the interviewer did 
not maintain adequate controls and inherently suggested high probability of error.190  
Christian similarly presents a liberal interpretation of acceptable error rate.  Here, the 
appellate court overturns the trial court’s decision to exclude the evidence because it 
lacked a “baseline” lung assessment, holding that a pre-injury test for comparison was not 
compulsory.191  This is significant because a pre-injury test would seem to fall under the 
genre of controls.  Thus, holding that the trial court erred by applying too rigorous a 
standard for adequate controls conveys that Oklahoma courts may have a more relaxed 
expectation for control and accuracy.  
One of the largest studies on the accuracy of fMRI revealed a 7 - 10% error rate, 
which is considered impressive for an emerging science.192  Other studies have produced 
even lower rates of error when fMRI is used to test the basic question of true or false, 
some as accurate as 99%.193 Laken is currently promoting 97% accuracy for Cephos 
Corporation, and expects improvement.194  This figure is a product of studies performed 
at his facility and reviewed at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, in 
Dallas.195  Similarly, Huizenga states that No Lie MRI, Inc. will soon be promoting 
accuracy rates of 95%.196  This is a more cautious figure, but Huizenga qualifies that as a 
product of the current studies the accuracy rate should rise to 99% in three to ten years.197  
99% accuracy is extremely significant because for methods such as fMRI testing, perfect 
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accuracy is - in theory under the Heisenberg uncertainty principle - impossible.198  
Although there are still problems with fMRI, the techniques for deception detection are 
continually improving.199  
Another consideration under Daubert is the controls and standards for the 
science.200  This is an area where fMRI will fare well, because so little of the process is 
performed by humans.  A computer presents a question to which the subject responds, 
and advanced computer software receives the answer and analyzes the results.201  
Although MRI machines are run and monitored by humans, the test is essentially an 
autopilot function without the presence of an examiner; the analysis and conclusions are 
entirely the result of the algorithmic computer programs, which provide high spatial 
resolution.202  This computerized aspect places fMRI testing in a whole different class of 
control than most other types of evidence which use human interpretation to reach results, 
such as fingerprinting and even, to an extent, DNA sequencing. Commentators have 
noted that this “reduced risk of human fallibility associated with . . . fMRI tests” will 
increase the likelihood that fMRI is considered reliable by courts where polygraph testing 
was found insufficient.203   
Furthermore, the open source software for fMRI testing is refined every few 
years, and Laken expects these advancements to continue.204  Laken also anticipates 
additional improvements in the algorithmic equations employed to interpret fMRI data, 
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which will further increase accuracy.205  As both the scanning technology and analyzing 
software continue to progress before fMRI technology is offered in court, the amount of 
effective control in the procedure will certainly weigh heavily in favor of the reliability of 
this technology. 
The current fMRI deception detection studies have been producing differing rates 
of error, but in general these error rates are relatively low.206  There is also a general 
expectation that the technology will improve until it reaches an error rate of near zero.207  
If fMRI deception detection were presented in Oklahoma court today, it is extremely 
likely that the accuracy rates presented, generally above 90%, would be sufficient for the 
court to consider the technology reliable.208  Moreover, as the accuracy of fMRI 
deception detection continually improves, the chances of this technology satisfying the 
error rate factor will likewise continually improve. Thus, if it is not subject to Daubert 
until several years from now it will certainly take more than a criticism of accuracy to 
exclude this evidence.  Overall, the increasingly low error rate of fMRI deception 
detection will strongly encourage Oklahoma courts to find this technology reliable. 
D. General Acceptance  
 The final factor the Daubert court discusses when deciding on the reliability of 
novel science is the general acceptance the science has gained within the scientific 
community.209  This is a direct reference to the earlier Frye standard that the Court has 
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incorporated into the Daubert analysis,210 yet in the current analysis it will no longer be 
dispositive, but will be weighed alongside the other three factors.211  The Court states that 
although general acceptance is no longer an ultimate standard, “a known technique which 
has been able to attract only minimal support within the community. . . may properly be 
viewed with skepticism.”212 
 In Oklahoma, the Taylor court held that it was “abundantly clear” that the DNA 
methods in question had been generally accepted by the relevant scientific community, 
based on the testimony of two experts.213  In Wood, the court reached the same 
conclusion, but felt the general acceptance factor had necessarily been satisfied because 
numerous other jurisdictions had found the PCR method to be generally accepted within 
the scientific community.214  These two cases consider different standards for general 
acceptance while reaching a similar conclusion.  Wood describes a situation where the 
science has been admitted in other jurisdictions and the court may look to other 
assessments of general acceptance.  Conversely, Taylor suggests that Oklahoma may be 
willing to find general acceptance of the novel science in question based only on the 
testimony of experts that such general acceptance exists.  The Gilson decision does not 
appear to suggest an especially difficult hurdle to finding general acceptance either, since 
this court found no evidence at all in the record to support general acceptance in the 
applicable field when holding that the method was not generally accepted.  None of these 
cases discussed general acceptance in depth once some evidence of acceptance was 
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presented, so perhaps a mere statement by credible experts that fMRI deception detection 
is generally accepted would suffice. 
 Experts do have differing opinions over the accuracy and advanced capabilities of 
fMRI technology regarding deception detection, yet it is generally accepted within the 
neuroimaging community that drawing conclusions based on correlations between 
activity in certain neural regions and deception is a valid science.215  The sheer number of 
leading research groups who are developing and standardizing fMRI deception detection 
speaks to the growth of its acceptance.216  Although Oklahoma cases which consider 
general acceptance in a Daubert analysis have not discussed a situation where evidence is 
presented to both establishe and refute general acceptance, a credible showing of fMRI 
acceptance within at least the specific area of neuroimaging advancement would likely be 
sufficient to weigh in favor of reliability as a whole in a Daubert analysis.   
E. Relevance of Novel Science 
 The second prong of Daubert considered whether the novel science “properly can 
be applied to the facts in issue,”217 although the court does not discuss this element in 
length.  This prong is effectively an assessment of relevance.  The Taylor court merely 
mentions this prong - stating that the science must assist the jury - and finds that DNA 
matching is clearly relevant to determining whether the defendant was guilty of rape.218  
The Wood court does not discuss this prong at all in their review of the trial court’s 
Daubert analysis.219  In regards to the instant situation, it is key to remember that the 
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credibility of testimony is always relevant.  Because fMRI results which support or 
discredit the credibility of testimony will certainly be relevant to fact finding, meeting the 
relevance prong will not be an issue. 
 Ultimately, fMRI evidence should prove admissible in Oklahoma courts under a 
true Daubert analysis.  Although there is some concern that courts may apply the 
reliability factors as a checklist and disallow a novel science when only one factor does 
not support reliability, the Daubert decision specifically cautioned against this.220  None 
of the Oklahoma cases reviewing a Daubert analysis consider this specific situation, but 
neither does the language in these cases suggest such a “checklist” approach would be 
taken.  The language suggests that a reasonable amount of evidence from credible sources 
which supports reliability will result in the admissibility of expert evidence, and that 
Oklahoma courts are willing to embrace novel science. fMRI deception detection 
technology currently has much support from academics who praise its accuracy and 
reliability, and because fMRI is an area of high interest in the neuro-imaging community 
the research and effort behind its development will continue as more funding becomes 
available.221  This should provide sufficient weight under each of the reliability factors.  
Even if one factor demonstrates less reliability than the others, a balance of the factors 
together should still be sufficient to hold fMRI reliable in a true interpretation of 
Daubert.  Section 2702 merely requires specialized evidence to be scientifically reliable, 
which means that it must be accurate and reproducible.222  As Steven Morese, J.D., Ph. D. 
optimistically states, “[i]f neuroscientific evidence is specifically relevant in an individual 
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case, as Daubert requires, and it is based on competent science, it will be admitted.”223  
Thus, it is highly probable that if fMRI evidence is offered in Oklahoma courts it will 
succeed under Oklahoma Evidence Code section 2702, and likely that a similar result will 
be reached in the Tenth Circuit under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 
VI. Other Admissibility Hurdles 
 Although fMRI deception detection demonstrates adequate scientific reliability to 
recommend admission under a true Daubert analysis, there are several other issues that 
may prove detrimental to admission in Oklahoma courts.  The possibility of evidence that 
proposes to visually interpret a person’s thoughts raises questions of jury confusion, 
overreaching influence, social stigmas regarding “mind reading” technology, and even an 
elimination of the jury completely.  This section will discuss admissibility hurdles under 
Oklahoma Evidence Code section 2403, the concern that fMRI technology invades the 
province of the jury and the possible influence of a societal aversion to fMRI on judges.  
This section will conclude by mentioning several other relevant issues that cannot be 
discussed fully in this comment, but may develop once fMRI evidence is admitted. 
A. Oklahoma Evidence Code Section 2403 
 Chief Judge Gibson of the Eighth Circuit wrote that if lie detection evidence is 
admitted in court “it is likely to be shrouded with an aura of near infallibility, akin to the 
ancient oracle of Delphi.”224  Ironically, the reputation for “near infallibility” that fMRI 
researchers are promoting may also prove a detriment to its admittance.  One of the most 
difficult evidentiary obstacles that fMRI deception detection evidence may face is section 
2403, which governs the admittance of evidence which is relevant, but perhaps 
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inadmissible because of another overwhelming concern, usually that it is too 
influential.225  Oklahoma Evidence Code section 2403 states: “Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence, or unfair and harmful surprise . . . .”226  This rule is 
nearly identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which was discussed in Daubert, as 
well as many other cases that consider the admission of novel science.227  Specifically, 
“undue prejudice,” “confusion of the issues” and “misleading the jury” are grounds on 
which fMRI might be ruled inadmissible.228  
One concern judges may have is that jurors will overvalue evidence from an 
impressive new lie detection technology and accept these results as conclusive, despite 
cross-examination regarding possible error.229  In United States v. Scheffer, the United 
States Supreme Court recognized this inherent issue as applied to traditional polygraph 
evidence, fearing the “risk that juries will give excessive weight to the opinions of a 
polygrapher . . . .”230  The Tenth Circuit recognized the same issue in United States v. 
Call, noting that the scientific nature of lie detection procedures may cause the jury to 
overvalue this evidence.231  Judges will likely have the same concerns when considering 
fMRI evidence.  
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Moreover, there are certain aspects of fMRI evidence that would make this 
concern even more compelling, such as the impact that vivid high-resolution images 
which illustrate an individual’s neural activity will have on the jury .232  Such brightly 
visualized images may create a false sense of familiarity with the science, which 
increases the undue prejudice of the scientific evidence.233  In an interview regarding the 
potential for fMRI images, 60 Minutes correspondent Lesley Stahl commented on this 
influence, stating that “[w]hen you show someone a brain scan people just believe it. It 
reeks of credibility.”234  Many scholars believe this is exactly what happened in the John 
Hinckley trial: despite testimony by a radiologist who refuted the basis of the defense’s 
argument, the jury was over-awed by evidence of a CT scan and improperly returned a 
verdict of not guilty.235  Furthermore, today’s juries may be seduced by evidence that 
purports to be the product of state-of-the-art computer software due to our society’s 
excessive trust in computers as irrefutably accurate.236  These concerns over undue 
prejudice are well founded and could easily have an impact on the admissibility of fMRI 
evidence in Oklahoma. 
Judges may also see “confusion of the issues” or “misleading the jury” as a 
concern when evaluating fMRI evidence under section 2403 because they fear a jury may 
not be able to fully understand the evidence.237  In Daubert, the Court noted this 
possibility, stating “[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because 
of the difficulty in evaluating it.  Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible 
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prejudice against probative force . . . exercises more control over experts than over lay 
witnesses.”238  Presenting fMRI evidence would entail at least a cursory explanation of 
how the scan is performed and the theory of different mental processes activating 
different neural regions.  The attorney would then present images of the neural activity 
during testimony to the jury and explain why these images support the truth or falsity of 
the testimony.  Finally, the jury would consider cross-examination of fMRI credibility 
which would likely be quite scientific in nature and cover error rates and possible flaws 
in the technical process or theory.  Clearly, this would all be well-advanced scientific 
discussion even as presented to the jury.  Although judges have allowed numerous types 
of expert testimony on intricate scientific evidence, technology which claims to “read the 
mind” certainly pushes the envelope.  Thus, a judge could foreseeably exclude this 
evidence on the basis that it would confuse a jury and not aid in the ultimate assessment 
of a verdict.  
An exclusion under section 2403 is especially effective because the trial or 
hearing judge has great discretion to find that the probative value of evidence has been 
outweighed.239  An appellate court will not reverse a section 2403 ruling unless there has 
been a clear abuse of discretion.240  Unlike a Daubert exclusion that is now subject to de 
novo appellate review in Oklahoma, it would be fairly simple for a trial judge to exclude 
fMRI evidence under section 2403 with little opportunity for the appellate court to 
reverse.241  
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This very situation arose in United States v. Call, when the Tenth Circuit 
reviewed the exclusion of polygraph evidence under the new Daubert standard.242  In 
Call, the district court excluded the polygraph evidence under both Daubert and Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403, which is nearly identical to Oklahoma Evidence Code section 
2403243 and also is subject to review only for abuse of discretion.244  The Tenth Circuit 
decision referenced “the danger that the jury may overvalue polygraph results as an 
indicator of truthfulness because of the polygraph’s scientific nature.”245  Although the 
federal standard for a review of a Daubert analysis is abuse of discretion, unlike in 
Oklahoma, the Tenth Circuit still held that it was unnecessary to reach the questions 
posed by a review of the district court’s Daubert analysis because the polygraph evidence 
was properly excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.246  
Remarkably however, in Taylor, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
revisited the balance of probative value under section 2403, despite the high standard of 
review for such rulings, and found that the exclusion was an abuse of discretion.247  The 
court held that DNA sequencing “evidence was highly probative on the issue of the 
perpetrator’s identity,” and that it was not unfairly prejudicial; it merely tended to 
incriminate the defendant.248  The court made no mention of this relatively advanced and 
incredible science confusing the jury or being given too much weight.  This language 
suggests that Oklahoma courts may see no prejudicial detriment in admitting complex 
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novel scientific evidence, even when such breakthrough evidence would likely have a 
forceful impact on the jury, as evidence of a DNA match does.   
fMRI evidence is quite advanced and new, but no more so than DNA sequencing 
was in 1995.  Both sciences share a further similarity in that admission of such evidence 
could potentially decide the case in which it is introduced.  In contrast, polygraph 
evidence has long been plagued with a stigma of fallibility, and the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals rejected this evidence specifically because of “the potential 
unreliability of polygraph examinations.”249  Such unreliability lessens the probative 
value of scientific evidence in a section 2403 balancing analysis.  Conversely, fMRI has 
demonstrated a very high level of accuracy, which is expected to improve.250  Also, 
evidence that could aid a jury in determining credibility is extremely valuable since 
research has shown lay people to be quite inaccurate when detecting lies: the accuracy 
rates are only around 60%.251  Judge Duniway of the Ninth Circuit discusses this 
shortcoming of the jury in a dissent regarding the deference given to credibility 
determinations on appeal:252  
I am convinced, both from experience as a trial lawyer and from 
experience as an appellate judge, that much that is thought and said about 
the trier of fact as a lie detector is myth or folklore.  Every trial lawyer 
knows, and most trial judges will admit, that it is not unusual for an 
accomplished liar to fool a jury (or, even, heaven forbid, a trial judge) into 
believing him because his demeanor is so convincing.  The expression of 
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his countenance may be open and frank; he may sit squarely in the chair, 
with no squirming; he may show no nervousness; his answers to questions 
may be clear, concise and audible, and given without hesitation; his 
coloration may be normal neither pale nor flushed.  In short, he may 
appear to be the trial lawyer's ideal witness.  He may also be a 
consummate liar . . . . Conversely, many trial lawyers, and some trial 
judges, will admit that the demeanor of a perfectly honest but 
unsophisticated or timid witness may be or can be made by an astute 
cross-examiner to be such that he will be thought by the jury or the judge 
to be a liar.  He may be unable to face the cross-examiner, the jury, or the 
judge; he may slouch and squirm in the chair; he may be obviously tense 
and nervous; his answers to questions may be indirect, rambling, and 
inaudible; he may hesitate before answering; he may alternately turn pale 
and blush.  In short, he may, to the trier of fact, be a liar, but in fact be 
entirely truthful.253 
Thus, a highly reliable scientific means to aid in accurately determining witness 
credibility has great probative value.  In the case of fMRI evidence, the probative value 
of such reliable scientific evidence would be much higher than that of the polygraph test 
in past rulings, making it more likely that fMRI’s probative value will outweigh any 
possible concerns over prejudice or confusion.254  Because the Oklahoma Court of 
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Criminal Appeals found no fault in the level of impact and complexity of highly 
probative DNA evidence, it is likely that if fMRI evidence is held to be reliable under 
Daubert then this evidence will also pass a section 2403 balancing test. 
B. Province of the Jury 
While section 2403 addresses concerns about evidence that may have too great an 
impact on the jury’s decision, some critics of fMRI evidence, and all lie detection 
evidence, suggest that these technologies go beyond influencing the jury and threaten the 
very existence of the jury itself.  The United States Supreme Court voiced this concern in 
Scheffer with regards to the exclusion of polygraph evidence:  
A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that ‘the jury is the 
lie detector.’  Determining the weight and credibility of witness testimony, 
therefore, has long been held to be the ‘part of every case [that] belongs to 
the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence 
and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men.’  By its very 
nature, polygraph evidence may diminish the jury’s role in making 
credibility determinations.255 
In cases which turn on the credibility of opposing witnesses, a perfect lie detector 
could produce an infallible result and the judge would simply rule for the side telling the 
truth.  No jury would be necessary.  In a legal system where the promise of a jury is 
paramount, this idea causes deep unrest.  Scholars have noted that some judges may 
simply reject this evidence because lie detection evidence of any kind encroaches on the 
province of the jury to the point that no role is left for the jury.256  The decision in 
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Scheffer to allow categorical exclusion of polygraph evidence in court-martial 
proceedings was based as much on the fear that “the traditional responsibility of court 
members to ascertain the facts and adjudge guilt or innocence would be usurped,” as on a 
finding that polygraph evidence was not reliable enough for admission.257  Similarly, in 
disallowing polygraph evidence under Daubert, the Tenth Circuit stated that “[t]he 
credibility of witnesses is generally not an appropriate subject for expert testimony . . . 
because it usurps a critical function of the jury.”258  
This line of thinking is consistent with the decades of decisions that have kept 
polygraph evidence out of court, and will almost certainly be an argument for excluding 
fMRI evidence as well.  Nevertheless, we only recently have learned how truly limited 
the ability of juries to accurately discern veracity is.259  One argument for admitting fMRI 
evidence is that these results will not displace the jury’s fact finding power, but rather 
will be a much needed aid to difficult credibility determinations of key witnesses that will 
help the jury to better weigh the evidence presented at trial as a whole.260  The dissent in 
Scheffer reflected this belief, stating that lie detection evidence does not displace the 
jury’s role.261  Instead, evidence that bears on credibility is merely helpful in making a 
credibility determination, and proper jury instruction will protect such evidence from 
becoming dispositive.262  In cases where the testimony is not self-narrative, judges or 
opposing attorneys can always remind the jury of the potential for subjectively honest yet 
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mistaken testimony, which would not cement the facts of a case even in the presence of 
fMRI evidence of perfect accuracy. 
In fact, most sciences can be viewed as either a means to assist the fact finder or 
as a means to shift power away from the fact finder, but this has not ultimately resulted in 
the exclusion of all science.  Even photography was once feared as an advancement that 
would usurp the court’s role in fact finding,263 but despite the potential for fraudulent 
images photographs are commonly admitted today.  Jurors have learned to properly 
consider photographs as only one piece of evidence - very influential but not absolute.264  
Similarly, fMRI evidence can be adapted to use in court through jury instruction and 
cross-examination.  These litigation tools can explain the nature of the science as merely 
evidence to assist in credibility determinations and can clarify the limitations of fMRI 
results.  An accurate understanding of the technology will allow the trier of fact to realize 
that they still must fulfill their role of evaluating all evidence, including fMRI deception 
detection results, to reach a verdict.265 
C. Societal Aversion to “Mind-Reading” Technology 
 In sixteenth century Tudor England, the country was for a time blanketed in fear 
because an increasingly tyrannical Henry VIII passed, and enforced through torture, a law 
that made the mere thought of treason a crime punishable by death.266  It has long since 
been established that thoughts alone cannot be criminally punished, but the fear of a 
court’s access to a person’s thoughts for the purpose of adjudication has endured.267  As 
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discussed above, fMRI deception detection may prove to be a more accurate and reliable 
technology than many well-accepted forms of evidence, but perhaps the most difficult 
obstacle to overcome - and the one which is most likely to skew judicial interpretation of 
the law - is an inherent distrust of any science which purports to “read a person’s mind”.  
The presumption that an individual’s ideas are protected is deeply imbedded in our 
society and our constitution, and in an age where privacy is constantly threatened the 
mind is often considered the last truly private sanctuary.268  Now, for the first time in all 
of history the technology may exist to allow, not our testimony or actions, but our 
thoughts themselves to be proven as evidence in court.  Scholars are already discussing 
the horror of “state action that punishes an individual or holds an individual responsible 
for thoughts.”269  One author has theorized that these “Orwellian fears” will play a more 
important role in excluding fMRI evidence than the evidentiary codes themselves.270  
Some critics have made comprehensive statements that fMRI deception detection 
evidence should never be admitted in judicial proceedings.  In a public debate regarding 
the admissibility of fMRI lie detection, United States District Judge Jed Rakoff was 
firmly opposed to admissibility, as revealed in the title to his comments: “Can Science 
Detect Lies? Not in My Court.”271  Although Judge Rakoff claimed to respect the 
progress being made in this field, he still believed that fMRI deception detection would 
lead to more “mischief” than benefit in the courtroom and that veracity is better 
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discovered through the traditional means of cross-examination.272  Such absolute 
rejection of fMRI technology in the wake of other imperfect scientific developments that 
have been admitted, such as DNA, diagnostic medical tests, and complex forensic 
evidence, may reflect a deeper held presumption against “mind-reading” science.  
 Similarly, a recent New York Times article discussed “neurolaw” and whether “the 
use of brain-scanning technology as a kind of super mind-reading device will threaten our 
privacy and mental freedom,” even suggesting that a new legal concept of “cognitive 
liberty” may develop as a result.273  The medical community is aware of this stigma, as 
indicated by Joesph Fins’ article entitled “The Orwellian Threat to Emerging 
Neurodiagnostic Technologies.”274  Fins’ article discusses why “[i]nterventions which 
involve the brain have long been prone to special scrutiny,”275 and urges medical 
professionals not to exaggerate the capabilities of neuroimaging technologies lest “their 
legitimate diagnostic use [be] undermined and made more difficult.”276  
 Could Oklahoma courts interpret the law more stringently because there is a fear 
of enabling “mind-reading” technologies to gain an undesirable foothold in our legal 
system, even when they have realistically satisfied an objective Daubert analysis?  
Possibly the language in Slaughter calling brain fingerprinting “interesting,” “startling” 
and “unconvincing” reflects exactly this stigma - that such science is uncertain at best, 
and surely inappropriate for a stable judicial system.  Or perhaps it is merely a well-
earned reaction to poorly presented evidence with almost no documented support for an 
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admittedly revolutionary claim.  Perhaps Oklahoma courts will embrace fMRI deception 
detection evidence once it satisfies the Daubert standard, just as they have embraced MRI 
and CAT scan results as beneficial and now commonplace advancements.  Still, the fact 
remains that there is at least some societal aversion to technologies which purport to 
invade the mind.277  This may not bar fMRI from admissibility in Oklahoma court, but it 
likely will not make the evidentiary hurdles easier, so the doctors and scientists 
promoting fMRI evidence had better be ready to put on a good show when their day in 
court comes. 
D. Further Concerns  
 Even if fMRI deception detection passes the numerous admissibility hurdles 
under the Oklahoma Evidence Code, there is a wide array of other concerns that critics 
have raised as affecting the potential legal uses of this science.  Could an individual be 
forcibly subjected to fMRI testing?  If so, then in what situations and under what 
conditions?  Because of the compelling nature of fMRI deception detection results as 
potential evidence, this science will face rigorous scrutiny under constitutional law, 
health care and research regulations, employment regulation and even with regard to 
homeland security, and the outcomes will likely be observed by Oklahoma courts.  This 
comment will mention these concerns, although a full understanding of each issue will 
reach far beyond the scope of evidentiary analysis and this comment.   
Perhaps the most common of these issues is the implications of fMRI evidence in 
the context of constitutional law.  The Bill of Rights is intended to protect against 
inappropriate methods for obtaining evidence, namely the Fourth Amendment prohibition 
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against unreasonable search and seizure and the Fifth Amendment prohibition against 
compulsory self-incrimination.278  Such offenses are most likely when the evidence is 
potentially powerful, as in the case of fMRI deception detection results.279  Because fMRI 
results produce evidence from an individual’s body, the individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and to compel an fMRI would constitute a search, despite the fact 
that the information is retrieved without physically intruding into the body.280  As a 
result, without the consent of the individual the government would need a warrant based 
on probable cause that this person’s testimony is or would be false.281  This would most 
likely be a reasonable search, however, as a scan that poses little or no risk to the subject 
is even less invasive than the forcible taking of blood which is held to be reasonable.282  
The second major constitutional matter, the privilege against self-incrimination, 
revolves around whether fMRI deception detection results are testimonial or physical.283  
The idea of compelled fMRI testing is problematic from the start because even minimal 
head movement during the procedure could destroy the accuracy of the result,284 and it 
would be difficult to prevent an individual from moving if they were disinclined to 
participate willingly.  Severe sedation is a poor solution because this would not result in 
                                                 
278
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
279
 fMRI evidence has the potential to be the ultimate exculpatory device, but could also be equally 
damning in nature. The lure of obtaining this evidence for use against a defendant in a criminal trial (which 
would seem to promise to secure any conviction) tempt prosecutors and investigators to push the envelope 
when inducing defendants to agree to fMRI procedures.  
280
 Even though an fMRI test does not physically enter the body, retrieving evidence without physical 
invasion by technological means still constitutes search and seizure.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
358 (1967).  Because an fMRI test extracts evidence from the body it is similar to having a blood sample 
taken from the body.  Taking blood however, has been held a reasonable search and seizure.  Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 758 (1966).  Therefore, an even less intrusive gathering of evidence such as a 
neural scan would almost certainly be considered reasonable.  See also Pardo, supra note 263, at 325. 
281
 See discussion supra note 281. 
282
 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758-59. 
283
 Id. at 328. 
284
 Telephone Interview with Joel Huizenga, supra note 14. 
    
 54 
acceptable cognition for providing testimony.285  Even if this problem is resolved 
however, the Fifth Amendment prevents an individual from being compelled to 
incriminate him or herself.286  If the nature of compelled fMRI results which provide 
answers to questions directly related to litigation are held to be within the scope of 
“testimonial,” then the Fifth Amendment will prevent this evidence from being 
admitted.287  This could be possible if the court finds that in proffering fMRI deception 
detection results “the State use[s] as evidence against [the subject of the fMRI] the 
substance of his disclosures.”288  Conversely, the physical and scientific nature of the 
procedure may be found similar to fingerprints, urine or blood samples, which do not 
offend the self-incrimination clause.289  Currently, there is no clear indication towards 
either outcome.290  
Nevertheless, such constitutional questions are likely irrelevant at this point 
because fMRI evidence is not currently being promoted as evidence for prosecutors;  
According to Laken, all current interest in the use of fMRI deception detection in court 
comes from defendants or judiciary interest in use for defense purposes.291 A voluntary 
fMRI procedure would avoid both the self-incrimination issue and the reasonable search 
and seizure issue, and for now would focus only on evidentiary obstacles.  Although 
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these questions may come into play later, it is highly unlikely that they will have any 
effect on the initial admissibility rulings in Oklahoma court.292 
Another peripheral concern is how to treat the results of fMRI research which 
inadvertently reveal a medical condition of the subject being examined.  Privacy rights 
could potentially be implicated if the subject does not wish to know about the 
condition.293  There is also a risk that the information could be leaked to discriminatory 
employers despite confidentiality agreements.294  The Americans with Disabilities Act 
limits an employer’s use of medical examinations that screen for certain traits, but the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has excluded “tests designed and used only 
to measure honesty” from the definition of medical examinations.295 
 There are also certain regulations pertaining to the polygraph test which may be 
interpreted to apply to fMRI technology.  For example, a 2005 federal statute, the 
Employee Polygraph Protection Act, states that with certain exemptions it is unlawful for 
an employer to subject an employee to a “lie detector test.”296  Lie detector test for this 
purpose is defined as “polygraph . . . or any other similar device (whether mechanical or 
electrical) that is used . . . for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the 
honesty or dishonesty of an individual.”297  Although fMRI is not specifically named, it is 
highly likely that this statute will be applied to any neuroimaging lie detection technology 
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because of the statute’s clear intent to encompass as-yet-undeveloped or unlisted lie 
detection methods. 
One last issue worth mention is the potential implications the war on terror may 
have on fMRI deception detection development.  The government is highly interested in 
acquiring advanced and accurate lie detection technology, as evidenced by the 
tremendous amount of funding from the Department of Defense and the Department of 
Homeland Security designated to investigating polygraphs and neural sciences,298 
although these technologies differs greatly from the fMRI application discussed in this 
comment.  Amid intense current debate over the balance between controversial detention 
practices such as water-boarding and the protection of U.S. citizens, the government 
interest in technology to accurately and harmlessly determine truth may grow.  At the 
least, it may affect the attitudes toward and regulation of fMRI.  One author hypothesizes 
that the U.S. “legal response to the war on terror” may pave the way to “justifying the use 
of privacy invasive techniques,”299 such as fMRI.  Even a leading researcher, Scott Faro, 
M.D., believes that fMRI will likely be applied to “issues related to terrorism, national 
security, and high-level corporate crime,” and that in these realms the exorbitant cost of 
fMRI tests for mere screening “could be worth it.”300  Although such developments are 
merely speculative at this time, fMRI technology certainly has the potential to incite 
debate in the areas of privacy and national security. 
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As seen in these examples, fMRI deception detection has the potential for 
application in many different contexts and will face distinctive challenges in each.  
Although it is yet unknown how judges may rule with regard to many of these situations, 
in all cases where fMRI evidence is proffered in court, this science will first have to 
overcome admissibility hurdles which mirror or are similar to those in the Oklahoma 
Evidence Code.301  Still, it is advantageous to be familiar with the emerging issues which 
could immediately develop if fMRI evidence does survive a Daubert analysis and the 
section 2403 balancing test.  
VII. Conclusion 
 Without a recorded case of fMRI deception detection evidence being offered at 
trial, this new science faces uncertainties, but amid continual study and escalating 
accuracy rates the potential for fMRI deception detection is undoubtedly phenomenal.  In 
Oklahoma court, admissibility will turn on the Daubert standard for reliability and the 
section 2403 balancing test, evidentiary hurdles which nearly mirror their counterparts in 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and many other states.  Although Daubert presents several 
factors which scrutinize the reliability of a science, fMRI deception detection has been 
thoroughly subjected to extensive testing, publication and peer review, and has produced 
extraordinary accuracy rates without being refuted by a single publication in the field of 
neuroscience.302  fMRI deception detection is a unique science, set apart from 
polygraphs, other neuroimaging techniques, and even other fMRI applications.  It should 
properly be analyzed as such and not subjected to preconceptions associated with any 
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previous methodologies presented as science.  The Daubert factors essentially question 
the reproducibility and accuracy of a novel science in a way that gives it equal footing 
with long-established sciences, and if analyzed objectively, fMRI deception detection 
should pass with flying colors.  
Section 2403 does present an opportunity for stigmas against “mind reading” 
technology, or alternately a fear of science that might usurp the jury’s role, to be manifest 
in a ruling that bars fMRI evidence as being overly influential or confusing to the jury.  
Nevertheless, accurate fMRI deception detection evidence has a very high probative 
value and can be assimilated into the legal context in the same way that DNA, CAT 
scans, forensics, and many other types of evidence have, even though these 
advancements were, at their time of first impression, equally astounding and persuasive 
as evidence.  Oklahoma courts have not shown an aversion to novel science or applied 
the evidentiary standards in an especially severe way.  Oklahoma’s judicial system is 
quite capable of evaluating and appropriately applying what will likely become an 
invaluable legal tool.  
As Professor Henry T. Greely states, “The invention by neuroscientists of 
perfectly or extremely reliable lie-detecting or truth-compelling methods might have 
substantial effects on almost every trial and on the entire judicial system.”303  However, 
fMRI evidence remains a reliable science that satisfies the requirements of the Oklahoma 
Evidence Code.  The implications of a technology that can ascertain deception goes to the 
heart of the goal of our jurisprudence: to determine and promote veracity and justice.  
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Rather than fear the misapplication of such an important advancement, courts should 
eagerly anticipate the development of law that allows the judicial system to employ fMRI 
deception detection in the ongoing quest for truth.  
        
 
 
 
 
